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TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION AND THE
EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS
AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES
Bret Benedict*
I. INTRODUCTION
RANSNATIONAL pollution is an issue that has challenged North
America for over a hundred years.' Transnational pollution is
"pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part
within the area under jurisdiction of one [state] and which has adverse
effects, other than effects of a global nature, in the area under jurisdiction
of [another state]. ' 2 Allocation and quality control of water, for example,
has been a contentious issue between the United States and Mexico since
the 1800s. 3 The relationship between Canada and the United States, by
contrast, has not been quite as contentious, but obstacles still remain. In
2006, the 9th Circuit found Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., a Canadian corpo-
ration, in violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for discharging hazardous
substance into the Columbia River, located in British Columbia, which
then migrated downstream and into the state of Washington.4 This case
was expected to be the first of its kind to "directly address the issue of
whether CERCLA applies extraterritoriality when a foreign source re-
leases pollution into the United States and causes harm to the United
States."5
The 9th Circuit's decision has been met with some skepticism from the
legal community, from questioning whether the case was decided on
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Southern Methodist University; Articles Managing Edi-
tor of the International Law Review Association.
1. Margaret M. Sullivan, Transboundary Pollution from Mexico: Is Judicial Relief
Provided by International Principles of Tort Law, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 105, 108
(1987).
2. Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic
Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 681 (2007).
3. Id. at 692.
4. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2006).
5. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Dejd vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environ-
mental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water
Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. Rav. 363, 396 (2005).
864 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
proper legal grounds given the language of CERCLA,6 to fears that the
United States may face retribution from Canada.7 Despite this skepti-
cism, the decision has a large contingent of supporters who see the ruling
as a step towards encouraging the international community to take a
more proactive approach in dealing with transnational pollution.8 In fact,
exploring the ambiguities and difficulties regarding statutory interpreta-
tion of CERCLA in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. is deserving of
its own discussion, but it is beyond the scope of this comment.9 This com-
ment will explore the relationship of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States through the lens of Pakootas and its potential impact on these
three nations, as well as consider whether the decision violates interna-
tional comity principles. Part I provides a background of the relation-
ships between Canada and the United States as well as Mexico and the
United States, and then briefly describes a current issue facing Mexico
and the United States regarding a large wastewater treatment facility. It
concludes with the introduction of two important international agree-
ments regarding transnational pollution-the Stockholm Principles and the
Helsinki Rules. Part II takes a closer look at the CERCLA statute and
the facts and procedural history of the Pakootas case. Part III analyzes
several recent Canadian court decisions involving CERCLA, as well as
two specific Canadian statutes that address transnational pollution and
attempts to show that allowing a citizen to bring suit in his polluted State
against the source of pollution located in another State does not necessa-
rily take advantage of the comity between Canada and the United States,
and may in fact strengthen it. It concludes with a brief discussion of a
potential alternative approach to the issue. Part IV considers if and how
Pakootas has affected the principles announced in the Helsinki Rules and
Stockholm Principles and also discusses the effect that greater enforce-
ment by a private citizen might have. Then, Patootas' potential impact on
environmental groups will be discussed. Lastly, this comment will con-
clude by postulating in what direction the concept may be headed. This
concept will then be applied using a current situation between Mexico
and the United States involving the Maquiladora industry as a basis for
examination.
6. Rina Eisenberg, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 20 TUL. ENVTL L.J.
459, 473 (2007); Nathan L. Budde, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.: When
Outside the Borders Isn't Extraterritorial, or, Canada is in Washington, Right?, 15
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 675, 689 (2007).
7. Tom Campbell, Emerging Trends: Clearing the Air on Transboundary Pollution,
PILLSBURY, WINTHROP, SHAW, PITTMAN L.L.P.(2007), available at http://www.
pillsburylaw.comlcontent/portal/publications/2007/4/2007426151219890/Clearing
theAirTCampbell_April2007.pdf.
8. Hall, supra note 2, at 736-38.
9. Carson Hill Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001) ( "Neither
a logician nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of CERCLA.").
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
1. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
With over 5,500 miles of border, the United States and Canada have
the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world.10 Much of its suc-
cess is owed, in part, to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which "pro-
vides the principles and mechanisms to help resolve disputes and to
prevent future ones, primarily those concerning water quantity and water
quality along the boundary between Canada and the United States."11
The treaty itself was the consequence of the establishment of the Interna-
tional Waterways Commission in 1903, a joint effort between the two
countries aimed at addressing issues regarding shared waters.12 The re-
sult was the creation of the International Joint Commission (IJC), an in-
dependent organization made up of six representatives, three from
Canada, and three from the United States, which arbitrates disputes be-
tween the two countries.1 3 In accordance with Article IX of the treaty,
either country may submit a request for arbitration to the IJC.14 In order
to actually reach the arbitration stage, however, both countries must
agree to the arbitration.1 5 Though the Boundary Waters Treaty is gener-
ally described as a success in the area of environmental law,1 6 the lack of
enforcement mechanisms and the amount of time taken between the
emergence of a transnational issue and its final resolution have been
some of the treaty's more significant shortcomings, and will be discussed
below more fully.
2. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
During the 1920s a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, located approxi-
mately ten miles from the border, began discharging thousands of tons of
sulfur dioxide per month across the Columbia River and into the United
States.1 7 Upon entering Washington, the smoke caused significant dam-
age to crops and forests located within the state. 18 As a result, farmers in
the area organized the Citizens Protective Association (CPA) to oppose
10. Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What's Past Prologue: EPA
Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL L.J. 233, 237 (2006).
11. Treaties and Agreements: What is the Boundary Waters Treaty?, INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION: CANADA & UNITED STATES, (2008), available at http://
www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html.
12. Hall, supra note 2, at 694.
13. Commissioners, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION: CANADA & UNITED STATES
(2008), available at http://www.ijc.org/en/background/biogr-commiss.htm.
14. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, art. 9,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
15. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 318.
16. Hall, supra note 2, at 706-07.
17. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 243.
18. Trail Smelter Arbitration, UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO (2009), available at http://
www.law.uidaho.edu/default.aspx?pid=66516.
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the smelter. 19 In 1927, the U.S. State Department stepped in and, after
sending an official complaint to the government of Canada, requested
that the dispute be sent to the IJC for arbitration. 20 Canada agreed to the
arbitration, and in 1931 the ICJ recommended that Canada take remedial
steps to reduce emissions and also introduced a formula for calculating
damages suffered in the United States.21 These non-binding recommen-
dations included a $350,000 indemnification for damages.22
Unhappy with the amount of damages initially recommended, the
United States continued to pursue recourse against Canada and, in 1935,
the two countries entered into a Convention establishing a special arbi-
tration tribunal to determine if the amount awarded was appropriate. 23
In 1941 the tribunal vindicated the United States, finding damages in the
amount of $20,000,000 to be appropriate. 24 The Tribunal declared:
Under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another... when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 25
The Trail Smelter Arbitration is perhaps one of the most well-known
environmental disputes and is considered a fundamental part of interna-
tional law.26 But even after the tribunal stated that "Canada must refrain
from causing any damage through fumes in the State of Washington," the
smelter has continued to discharge other byproducts, primarily slag-a
by-product of the metal smelting process, into the Columbia River. One
report estimates the smelter discharges over 100,000 tons of slag each
year, and more copper and zinc than the sum of all discharges currently
permitted in the United States.27 Interestingly enough, it is the very same
smelter that caused the pollutants in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco to be dis-
charged into the Columbia River and over the border into Washington, 28
which is discussed further in Part II.
19. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 248.
20. Id. at 249.
21. The ICJ and the 21st Century, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Oct. 21, 1997,
at 10, available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdfIID1011.pdf.
22. Parrish, supra note 5, at 420.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 422.
25. Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80
AM. J. INT'L. L. 532, 553 (1986) (quoting from Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), Arbi-
tral Tribunal, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941)).
26. Parrish, supra note 5, at 420.
27. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 265-66.
28. Parrish, supra note 5, at 365.
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B. MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES
1. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and the Emergence and Downfall of
the Harmon Doctrine
The controversy between Mexico and the United States regarding ripa-
rian rights over the Rio Grande can be traced back to at least 1873, when
the waters of the Rio Grande shifted, cutting off approximately 600 acres
of Mexican land.2 9 The two countries disagreed as to the proper course
of action regarding the land that was now located within the territory of
the United States and submitted to arbitration in 1889, creating the Inter-
national and Boundary Commission (IBC).30 The Commission did not
reach a decision until 1911, when it awarded Mexico two-thirds of the
land in dispute, a decision which the United States refused to recognize. 31
The relationship between Mexico and the United States regarding
transnational pollution has not fared much better since, starting with an
"infamous misstep" taken by the Attorney General of the United States,
Judson Harmon, in 1895, when the United States began actively diverting
parts of the Rio Grande.32 Mexico's protest of this course of action led to
the articulation of a theory that came to be known as the Harmon Doc-
trine, which stated that "a riparian state has complete control over all
waters lying within its territory, and may utilize those waters without re-
gard for the effects of the downstream or co-riparian states. ' 33 Under
this doctrine, the United States would have an absolute right to all waters
flowing alongside New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas.34 The United
States, however, never officially applied or adopted the Harmon Doc-
trine, choosing instead to enter into a treaty with Mexico in 1906 that
called for equitable distribution of the river.35 Indeed, this doctrine, also
known as the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, represents one of
two extreme views and has been widely denounced. 36 At the other end of
the spectrum is the theory of absolute territorial integrity, which forbids a
State from developing a watercourse in such a way that damages the
rights of the downstream state.37 Like the theory of absolute territorial
29. Paul Stanton Kibel & Jonathan R. Schutz, Rio Grande Designs: Texans' NAFTA
Water Claim Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 228, 231 (2007).
30. Id.
31. Id. (In fact, the dispute lasted until 1962, when President Kennedy recognized a
proposed compromise that was discussed with Mexico in 1911.).
32. Hall, supra note 2, at 692.
33. Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and
International Freshwater Law, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290, 325 (1996).
34. Robert E. Hall, Comment, Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportuni-
ties Under International Law for Groundwater Management in the United States-
Mexico Border Region, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 873, 880 (2004).
35. Hall, supra note 2, at 693.
36. Astrid Boos-Hersberger, Transboundary Water Pollution and State Responsibility:
The Sandoz Spill, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 103, 113 (1997).
37. Kevin P. Scanlan, The International Law Commission's First Ten Draft Articles on
the Law of the Non-navigational Use of International Watercourses: Do They Ade-
quately Address All the Major Issues of Water Usage in the Middle East? 19 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 2180, 2208 (1996).
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sovereignty, the theory of absolute territorial integrity has been widely
rejected.38 Perhaps this rejection is because each theory represents a dif-
ferent side of the same coin. Both make absolute claims about a re-
source, and neither recognizes the shared rights or interests between
States.39
It may be more accurate to characterize the relationship between these
two countries as one that recognizes the theory of limited territorial sov-
ereignty, which essentially represents a type of middle ground between
the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, on the one hand, and the
theory of absolute territorial integrity, on the other.40 According to the
theory of limited sovereignty, a State may make use of the waters flowing
through its territory so long as it does not interfere with the reasonable
use of waters by downstream states. 41 But rather than view this theory as
being located at a fixed point halfway between the two extremes, it may
be more helpful to view it on a continuum, shifting back and forth be-
tween the two absolute theories.42 This theory is also the one that is most
prevalent in the international community today.43 But as the current is-
sues between the two countries illustrate, the theory of limited sover-
eignty may be much easier to apply in theory than in practice.
2. Current Issues Facing Mexico and the United States
Disputes with Mexico over riparian rights did not end with the demise
of the Harmon Doctrine, however. In 1933, sewage from Tijuana began
flowing into San Ysidro, California. 44 In 1944, the United States entered
into a treaty with Mexico, commonly referred to as the 1944 Water
Treaty, and appealed again to the IBC, now called the International
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), to resolve the conflict.45 In
addition, the United States also agreed to provide Mexico with 1.5 million
acre-feet of water annually.46 Like the previous body before it, the effi-
cacy of the IBWC has also been called into doubt.47 In the 1980s, both
countries entered into the Border Area Pollution Agreement (BAPA);
38. Id.
39. Melanne Andromecca Civic, A New Conceptual Framework for Jordan River Ba-
sin Management: A Proposal for a Trusteeship Commission, 9 CoLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. . L. & POL'Y 285, 295 (1998).
40. Hall, supra note 34, at 880.
41. Schwabach, supra note 33, at 327.
42. Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-naviga-
tional Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the
Interest in Developing Upper Riparians, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 257, 276 (1998).
43. Carolin Spiegel, International Water Law: The Contribution of Western United
States Water Law to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigable
Uses of International Watercourse, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 333, 336-37(2005); see generally Stockholm Principles, infra note 71; see also Helsinki Rules,
infra note 91.
44. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 105.
45. Id. at 108.
46. Eric L. Garner & Michelle Ouellette, Future Shock? The Law of the Colorado
River in the Twenty-First Century, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 502 (1995).
47. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 108.
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however, neither the United States nor Mexico has committed any funds
to the agreement and, as a result, these agreements have been rendered
largely ineffective to date.48
Perhaps one of the most pressing concerns facing Mexico and the
United States in the field of environmental law is the ambitious Bajagua
Project, a wastewater treatment plant that, upon completion, is expected
to treat fifty-nine million gallons of polluted Tijuana water every day.4 9
Upon treatment, the reclaimed water would then be sold to Tijuana busi-
nesses. 50 This privately-financed undertaking will work in conjunction
with the IBWC and the Comisi6n Internacional de Lfmites y Aguas
(CILA), Mexico's version of the IBWC.5 1 But the project has been
plagued by fits and starts, failing to meet federal standards by missing
deadlines for obtaining a site in Mexico as well as awarding contracts.
52
In July 2007, for example, a congressional hearing discussing the project
dissolved into a shouting match.5 3 According to environmental attorney
Cory J. Briggs, who prepared a report on the project at the behest of the
San Diego Foundation, the project itself has "become all-consuming to
the point that it is impossible for any governmental agency at any level in
either country to make any meaningful headway in solving the real prob-
lem. ' ' 54 It appears that the U.S. government may be close to sounding the
death knell for the Bajagua Project, since federal officials announced a
$100 million plan in December 2008 to upgrade the wastewater-treatment
plant already in place in San Ysidro.55 The pollution is expected to
worsen as new homes are built on the Tijuana River, none of which are
connected to a sewage collection system.56
C. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (NAAEC)
Since the two countries signed the BAPA, several other similar agree-
ments have been reached, none of which appear to have had any signifi-
cant effect on transnational pollution. 57 With the creation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), however, more environmen-
tal concerns have been raised. In response to these concerns, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States passed a supplemental environmental
48. Id. at 109.
49. The Bajagua Project, BAJAGUA PROJECT, LLC, available at http://
www.bajagua.com/description.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
50. Dana Wilkie, Bajagua Plan Changes Draw Filner's Wrath; He Berates Federal Offi-
cials, Vows to Block Alternative; Private Company may be out, THE S. D. UNION-
TRIBUNE, July 11, 2007, at B1.
51. The Bajagua Project, supra note 49.
52. Terry Rodgers, Report Urges New Look at Two Border Sewage Ideas, THE S. D.
UNION-TRIBUNE, May 17, 2007, at B1.
53. Wilkie, supra note 50.
54. Rodgers, supra note 52.
55. Janine Ziga, From Council to Community; Winter to Focus on Water Quality, THE
S. D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2008, at SZ1.
56. Rodgers, supra note 52.
57. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 109.
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agreement to NAFTA, 58 which addresses a primary concern that a large
number of U.S. companies would move to Mexico and take advantage of
the relaxed enforcement of its environmental standards.59 This agree-
ment, called the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooper-
ation (NAAEC), permits any resident or non-governmental agency
(NGO) of a member nation to file a complaint alleging that the residents'
own nation is failing to comply with its own domestic environmental
law. 60 Next, the secretariat of the NAAEC decides whether the com-
plaint is worthy of further investigation and, if so, submits the complaint
to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a panel of
independent experts, who assess the claim and issue a non-binding report
detailing whether or not the country has violated its own environmental
laws. 61 Along with the European Community, the NAAEC is the only
other body in the world that allows for such a review process.62 Moreo-
ver, when conducting its initial assessment, the secretariat may rely upon
information "gathered through public consultations, such as conferences,
seminars and symposia. '63 As a result, public pressure may further en-
courage the offending State to take corrective action. 64 This type of citi-
zen participation, which may potentially allow an individual to hold its
own nation responsible for transnational pollution, has been called a
"critical tool in addressing domestic environmental problems and de-
serves a central role in proposals to reform the transboundary pollution
regime." 65
Unfortunately, the NAAEC also has several significant shortcomings.
Although it allows for any citizens or NGO to bring a claim, it is a time-
intensive process and, once a claim is submitted, the individual does not
have the right to prosecute further and must rely instead on the NAAEC
itself to purse recourse.66 Like The Stockholm Principles and The Hel-
sinki Rules before it, which are discussed infra Part I.D, the vague lan-
guage of the NAAEC agreement allows any of the NAF-IA countries the
opportunity to avoid liability. 67 With language stating that the parties
shall, "to the extent possible," publish their laws and provide interested
58. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, About Us, http://www.cec.org/
who we are/index.cfm?varlan=English (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
59. John H. Knox, International Decision: Edited by Daniel Bodansky: The 2005 Ac-
tivities of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 429, 438 (2006).
60. Id.
61. John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with the International Environ-
mental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commis-
sion, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 11 (2001).
62. Id.
63. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), art.
13(2)(e), Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M 1480.
64. Hall, supra note 34, at 895.
65. Hall, supra note 2, at 738.
66. Frona M. Powell, The North American Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion's San Diego Report: A Case Study and Analysis of the CECE Process, 6
ENVTL. LAW. 809, 824-25 (2000).
67. Id. at 826.
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persons with an opportunity to comment on them,68 and that each Party
"shall consider" adopting the recommendations of the NAAEC Council,
compliance appears to be less than mandatory. 69
But these difficulties have not caused a shortage of citizen complaints.
In 2005, for example, fifty-two complaints were submitted, eleven of
which caused factual records to be produced.70 So despite the shortcom-
ings of the NAAEC, the citizen-submission idea is a promising one and
will be discussed further in section IV. The following section will discuss
The Stockholm Principles and The Helsinki Rules, in order to develop an
idea of the responses by the international community as a whole regard-
ing the issue of transnational pollution.
D. TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION PROCEDURES AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: A DISCUSSION OF THE STOCKHOLM
PRINCIPLES AND THE HELSINKI RULES
1. The Stockholm Principles
The rule of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes (one must so use his own
rights as not to infringe upon the rights of others) provides for a satisfac-
tory starting point for international environmental law. In fact, it was this
rule that was adopted by the tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration
discussed above.7 1 As a result of the increasing concern over interna-
tional pollution, several nations convened to establish the general princi-
ples of international environmental law in Helsinki and then later again
in Stockholm. 72 Perhaps one of the most important principles announced
in the Stockholm Declaration was Principle 21:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 73
Although originally a non-binding agreement enunciating the general
principles of international environmental law, it has since achieved the
status of a substantive rule of customary international law.74 In fact, both
Canada and the United States regarded Principle 21 as a rule of custom-
68. See NAAEC, supra note 63, art. 4(2); Powell, supra note 66, at 826.
69. See NAAEC, supra note 63, art. 2(2); Powell, supra note 64, at 826.
70. Knox, supra note 59, at 438.
71. George Norman and Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 563 (2005).
72. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 109-10.
73. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Prin-
ciple 21, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972), available at http://www.unep.
org/Documents.MultilingualfDefault.Print.asp?DocumentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503
[hereinafter "Stockholm Principles"].
74. David A. Writh, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two
Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa? 29 GA. L. REv. 599, 620 (1995).
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ary international law. 75 Even still, the principle's vague language has
raised eyebrows and caused some uncertainty.76 On the other hand, this
language may lend itself to a more liberal interpretation of the principle.
For example, States may currently take two different approaches to the
treaty, one that is "territorial" and the other "global. ' 77 Under the terri-
torial approach, 78 which focuses on the first part of Principle 21, whereby
a State has a "sovereign right to exploit their own resources. . .,"79 com-
petition is encouraged at the potential expense of the environment. 80
The global approach, however, gives wide latitude in the interpretation of
the word "damage," and emphasizes a more cooperative approach among
states.81 It is likely no coincidence that the ambiguity of this principle
mirrors the historical development of United States-Mexico relations re-
garding transnational pollution,8 2 as it is this give and take that is often at
the center of a transnational pollution dispute.
For example, in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., where FMC con-
tracted with Amlon to ship materials to the United Kingdom that FMC
ensured Amlon were not hazardous, Amlon relied on the global ap-
proach and argued that FMC had violated the law of nations under Prin-
ciple 21 and caused damage to another State by shipping carcinogenic
pesticides, hazardous waste, and dioxin-forming substances in their con-
tainers.8 3 The court found Amlon's argument that FMC violated the law
of nations under Principle 21 to be misplaced because "those Principles
do not set forth any specific proscriptions, but rather refer only in a gen-
eral sense to the responsibility of nations to insure that activities within
their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment beyond their
borders. '8 4 While it is likely that the position Amlon took regarding the
global/territorial distinction did not affect the outcome of the case be-
cause the court found Principle 21 not to be a "law of nations, 85 the
vagueness of the language on which the court capitalized illustrates how
these differing interpretations arise in the first place. Neither is this
court's holding an aberration, as other federal courts have been hesitant
to recognize the convention at Stockholm as anything more than a gen-
eral responsibility8 6 despite the fact that, as stated earlier, the United
75. Id.
76. Klaus Bosselmann, Focus: Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime




79. Stockholm Principles, supra note 71, Principle 21.
80. See Bosselmann, supra note 74, at 146-47.
81. Id.
82. See discussion infra Part I.(B)(i).
83. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id.
86. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); but see
Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (acknowledging that the
Alien Tort Act might apply to environmental practices that violate international),
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States considered the statute to be customary international law at the
time of signing.87 The other similarly important convention, due in large
part because of its advancement of equitable utilization principle, was
held in Helsinki, several years earlier in 1966.88
2. The Helsinki Rules
Adopted in 1966, the Helsinki Rules impose a duty on nations to pre-
vent transnational pollution in specific factual contexts and is one of the
earliest attempts to address this issue.89 More recently, the International
Law Association (ILA), the same organization which produced the Hel-
sinki Rules, created the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources to super-
sede the Helsinki Rules. 90 But the international community has yet to
fully accept the Berlin Rules91 and a discussion of those rules and pro-
scriptions is beyond the scope of this comment. Though the principle
purpose of the Helsinki Rules was to regulate international rivers, trans-
national ground water was included as well.92 For example, article 10(1)
provides that a "state must prevent any new pollution or any increase in
the degree of existing water pollution ... which would cause substantial
injury in the territory of a co-basin state . . . 93 Generally, the Helsinki
Rules adopted the idea of limited territorial sovereignty, which provides
that a State may make use of the waters flowing through its territory to
the extent that such use does not interfere with the reasonable use of
waters by downstream states.94
In determining what is considered fair and equitable use of water under
The Helsinki Rules, eleven factors are to be considered. 95 This equity
principle, set forth in articles four and five, is currently one of the most
frequently utilized doctrines in transnational water agreements. 96 The
Helsinki Rules, however, leave open the question of what is to be done
when a fair and equitable use of water, as defined in the treaty, causes
dismissed on other grounds by Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
87. Writh, supra note 72.
88. Hall, supra note 33, at 883.
89. See Rose Mukhar, The Jordan River Basin and the Mountain Aquifier: The Trans-
boundary Freshwater Disputes Between Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the
Palestinians, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 59, 71-72 (2006).
90. See Joseph H. Dellapenna, International Law's Lesson for the Law of the Lakes, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 762-63 (2007).
91. Id. at 776.
92. Hall, supra note 33, at 884.
93. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki




94. Schwabach, supra note 32, at 327.
95. Helsinki Rules, supra note 91, arts. 4, 5.
96. Jonathan Lautze & Mark Giordano, Equity in Transboundary Water Law: Valua-
ble Paradigm or Merely Semantics? 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 89, 90
(2006).
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substantial injury.97 Does an individual have any recourse against the of-
fending sovereign, or is a fair and equitable use, by definition, one that
does not cause substantial injury to another? Like other international
agreements, the non-binding nature of The Helsinki Rules and The
Stockholm Principles limit their ability to be enforced effectively. 98
These collections of principles and rules, however, remain a vital part of
international environmental law and must be kept in mind while consid-
ering the Pakootas case and their potential application to a current situa-
tion in Mexico, which is discussed in Part IV.
II. A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT PAKOOTAS AND CERCLA
A. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT
Enacted by Congress in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) is a remedial statute
aimed at ensuring the immediate cleanup at a hazardous site and allocat-
ing the cost of the cleanup to the parties responsible for the problem. 99 It
is also under this statute that Pakootas pursued a cause of action against
Teck Cominco.100 CERCLA primarily serves a remedial function, which
differentiates it from similar U.S. environmental statutes such as the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, considered to be a command-
and-control statute; 1' neither is it a regulatory standard-setting statute,
unlike other environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act. 10 2 In order to provide prompt and effective cleanup of
hazardous sites, a finding of liability under CERCLA is contingent on a
party being placed in four broadly described categories.' 0 3 The four cate-
gories are: (1) current owners or operators of a facility where hazardous
substances were disposed; (2) previous owners or operators of a facility
where hazardous substances were disposed; (3) individuals that generated
or arranged for the disposal of the hazardous substance disposed at the
site; and (4) transporters of hazardous substances for a disposal at the
site/facility they selected.' 0 4
Teck Cominco was found liable under the third category, as an ar-
97. Michelle R. Sergent, Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1994 U.N. Draft Arti-
cles: Will the Progression of International Watercourse Law be Damned? 8 VILL.
ENVTL L.J. 435, 459-60 (1997).
98. Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Trans-
boundary Ground Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 201, 250 (2003).
99. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in
Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 334-35 (2004).
100. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1068.
101. Jordan Diamond, How CERCLA's Ambiguities Muddled the Question of Extrater-
ritoriality in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1013, 1017
(2007).
102. Budde, supra note 6, at 678-79.
103. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 276.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
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ranger of disposal of hazardous substances. 10 5 The Pakootas case has
raised concerns because of its application of CERCLA to a Canadian
corporation that had been conducting its business entirely within the
physical jurisdiction of Canada.10 6 In fact, a review of the literature indi-
cates that one's determination of whether the case was properly decided
will likely hinge on one's impressions regarding the issue of whether the
court did, or should have, applied CERCLA extraterritorially. 10 7 The
reason this issue is particularly contentious, disregarding for the moment
the potential backlash by the international community, is because the
other major federal statutes that deal with environmental issues, such as
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) have all been held to not apply extraterritorially,
although the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) may be
one possible exception to this position.108 It should also be noted, how-
ever, that the cases in which the above statutes have been applied have
involved Americans undertaking particular courses of action outside the
physical jurisdiction of the United States.109 With the above information
in mind, it is time to turn to the facts of Pakootas and the novel interna-
tional issues it has raised.
B. FACTS AND HISTORY OF PAKOOTAS V. TECK COMINCO
Beginning in the 1900s, a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, has
dumped tens of millions of tons of industrial waste and metals into the
105. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1082.
106. Parrish, supra note 5, at 386.
107. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 473 (noting that if one accepts the EPA's definition of
"releases" and "facilities", it is all but inevitable that a court will find the applica-
tion of CERCLA to be domestic); Budde, supra note 6, at 681-82 (noting that the
court was able to sidestep the issue of extraterritoriality application of CERCLA
because Teck Cominco's status as a "facility" was not contested, thus allowing the
court to determine only if the site in question was foreign or domestic); Diamond,
supra note 99, at 1040-41 (proposing that the case should have been decided based
on an extraterritorial application of CERCLA because the Washington long-arm
statute requires an intentional act within the forum state, while CERCLA itself is a
remedial statute that is traditionally unconcerned with party behaviors and motiva-
tions); Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 295-96 (arguing that the court was correct
in reaching its conclusion, because the Pakootas case involved a domestic applica-
tion of domestic law to resolve domestic harms, and is distinguishable on its face as
a domestic concern from the major cases that came before it); Katherine Hausrath,
Crossing Borders: The Extraterritorial Application of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 13 U BALT. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2005) (noting that often times when deciding if a statute can be
applied extraterritorially, the issue is determined by whether the violation is con-
sidered a market issue, such as antitrust and securities violations, or a non-market
issue, such as employment and environmental violations, and as a result of this
determination, any non-market violation almost inevitably leads to the conclusion
that the statue was not intended to be applied extraterritorially); Parrish, supra
note 5, at 386, 397 (stating that CERCLA's language likely permits its extraterrito-
rial application, but arguing that, as a matter of policy, applying domestic laws to
regulate or resolve transboundary disputes is myopic and that the alleged benefits
of such an application will likely not be realized.).
108. Hausrath, supra note 105, at 10-11.
109. Id. at 10.
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Columbia River.110 As briefly mentioned in Section II, the present case
centered on the same smelter that was emitting the plumes of smoke that
wafted over the border from Canada and into the United States alongside
the Columbia River. It is also along this same stretch of river in which
the slag has migrated into Washington and lead to allegations by some
U.S. citizens that the resultant discharge has caused "major environmen-
tal and human-health problems." ' One report has stated that the cop-
per and zinc discharges from the Trail Smelter exceeded the cumulative
totals for all U.S. companies and has recently discharged amounts of mer-
cury equivalent to over fifty percent of all U.S. releases into the water.112
The basis for the lawsuit against Teck Cominco began in 1999, when the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, a sovereign nation,113
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct con-
tamination testing in the Columbia River under CERCLA. 114 In 2003,
the EPA found arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, and zinc, in ad-
dition to the large amounts of slag.115 As a result of this finding, the EPA
determined that the site qualified for placement on the National Priori-
ties List (NPL) and held Teck Cominco responsible for the discharge.116
Placement on the NPL is significant because it indicates that the site is
among the most polluted in the United States,117 and, perhaps more im-
portantly, it makes the site eligible for remedial action financed by the
Superfund,11 8 which was established to compel the responsible parties to
either clean up the site themselves or reimburse the government for
cleanup conducted by the EPA. 119
At the same time, the EPA also began an informal negotiation process
with Teck Cominco and tried to persuade Teck Cominco's American sub-
sidiary to conduct a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study, 120
whereby Teck Cominco would determine the nature of the waste, assess
risk to human health and environment, and conduct treatability test-
ing.121 The EPA called off these negotiations within six months due to
lack of progress and entered formal negotiations with the company. 122
Formal negotiations were no more fruitful than the information negotia-
tions and were also called off because, although Teck Cominco offered to
110. Parrish, supra note 5, at 365.
111. Id. at 366.
112. Hall, supra note 2, at 733.
113. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Nation, Facts and Information, http://
www.colvilletribes.com/facts.htm (2000).
114. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 468-69.
115. Id. at 469.
116. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1069.
117. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 268.
118. Budde, supra note 6, at 676.
119. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Information: What is Superfund?,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (2009).
120. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 268.
121. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
(2007) http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/rifs.htm.
122. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 268.
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spend thirteen million dollars to conduct independent studies, it refused
to comply with the Superfund process. 123
Shortly thereafter, the EPA issued Teck Cominco a Unilateral Admin-
istrative Order (UAO) instructing the company to conduct a Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study in accordance with CERCLA. 124 The
EPA, however, did not take action to enforce the order.1 25 In 2004, the
Canadian government responded and sent a diplomatic note to the U.S.
State Department, which stated that the order issued by the EPA would
disrupt the current resolution process between the two countries regard-
ing transnational pollution. 126 The negotiations between the two govern-
ments fell through and, a year after the EPA issued its order, Joseph
Pakootas and Donald R. Michel, both members of the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation instituted a citizen-suit, which was later
joined by the state of Washington, against Teck Cominco to force the
company to comply with the order issued by the EPA.1 27
III. IN DEFENSE OF PAKOOTAS
Though there is no doubt that some criticism of the decision is justifia-
ble based on the inherent ambiguity in the wording of the CERCLA stat-
ute, one will also notice that all the acts necessary to trigger CERCLA
liability took place within the physical jurisdiction on the United
States.' 2 8 Of course, what may be the most damaging criticism of the
Pakootas decision is the idea that it results in an affront to Canadian sov-
ereignty. 129 This may not necessarily be the case, however, once one ex-
amines the laws and court decisions of Canada.
A. DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE CANADIAN COURTS
REGARDING CERCLA
1. United States v. Ivey
Liquid Disposal Industry (LDI) is a Michigan corporation that owned a
site listed on the NPL from 1967 until 1984.130 As a result, the EPA,
acting under the authority of CERCLA, sued Maziv Industries Ltd., Rob-
ert Ivey, the president and director of LDI who also served as president
and director of Maziv Industries, Ltd., a corporation based in Canada,
which was the majority shareholder of LDI.1 31 Defendant Ivey, however,
was served process for the suit in Canada.1 32 The question before the
123. Id. at 268.
124. Budde, supra note 6, at 676.
125. Id.
126. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 469.
127. Budde, supra note 6, at 676; Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., supra note 4.
128. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 297 (This includes the "release" to the "environ-
ment" from a "facility."); Id.
129. Id. at 273-74.
130. United States v. Ivey, 747 F.Supp. 1235, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1236.
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court, then, was whether CERCLA permitted extraterritorial service of
defendants. 133 The statute provides, in pertinent part, that "the United
States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all con-
troversies arising under this Act, without regard to the citizenship of the
parties or the amount in controversy,"1 34 and that "process may be served
in any district where the defendant is found, resides, transacts business, or
has appointed an agent for the service of process. ' 135 The district court
held that CERCLA by itself did not permit out of state service, but then
asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs regarding the Michigan
long-arm statute.1 36 After brief submission, the court determined that
the Michigan long-arm statute did permit service on the defendant in
such a manner that did not offend the Constitution of the United
States.137
The suit did not end with the district court's decision, however, as the
United States sought to enforce the judgment in motions court in Onta-
rio. In order for a Canadian court to recognize a foreign judgment, there
must be a "real and substantial connection" between the "rendering
province and the subject-matter of the action. 1 38 The Ontario court
found that the defendants engaged in a waste disposal business within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. district court and that Ivey regularly made deci-
sions concerning the same environmental issues raised by the plaintiff
and thus concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court
was not inappropriate.1 39 The court further stated that:
[t]he law would be seriously deficient and at odds with the reality of
modern commercial life if it were possible for a resident of this prov-
ince to actively engage in a business in the United States for a period
of several years, but then shelter behind the borders of Ontario from
answering to a claim for civil liability for harm caused by that
activity. 140
Next, the defense argued that the CERCLA provisions that formed the
basis of the district court's jurisdiction were penal in nature and that the
court should refuse to recognize the judgment on this basis. 41 The court,
relying on the 4th Circuit's decision in United States v. Monsanto, quickly
dismissed this argument and noted that the measure of recovery is di-
rectly tied to the cost of the required environmental cleanup and, so long
as the amounts sought were the same as the amounts expended by the
EPA, CERCLA remains a restitutionary statute and thus, could not be
characterized as one that is penal in nature.' 42 The defense then argued
133. Id. at 1237.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (2000).
135. Id. § 9613(e).
136. Ivey, 747 F.Supp at 1238.
137. Id. at 1239-40.
138. United States v. Ivey, [1995] 26 O.R. (3d) 533, 541 (O.S.C.J.).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 543.
141. Id. at 544.
142. Id.
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that enforcement of the judgment would violate the principles of natural
justice because Ivey was forced to defend a related nuisance action and
was also in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, the combination of
which deprived the defense of any opportunity to respond adequately to
the environmental problems at the contaminated site. 143 Ivey also argued
that the preclusion of judicial review prior to the implementation of a
remedial plan under CERCLA violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 144 The court responded that because Ivey refused to ap-
pear in the initial stages of the formulation of the EPA's cleanup plan, he
cannot now claim that he should be afforded added participation rights,
especially because "there has been no indication that [Ivey] had a case to
present that might have made a difference. 1 4 5
Ivey's final argument was that the procedural and substantive severity
of CERCLA violated Canada's public policy because Ontario's environ-
mental statute, the Ontario Environmental Protection Act (OEPA), does
not suffer from the same alleged defects of CERCLA.1 46 The court re-
jected Ivey's arguments for several reasons. Perhaps most interestingly,
the court found that a comparison of CERCLA to OEPA actually
strengthens the plaintiff's position because "the similarities between the
two regimes are more striking than the differences. 1 47 The Ontario
Court of Appeals later affirmed the ruling.' 4 8
2. United States v. Shield
More recently, the United States again sought enforcement of a CER-
CLA judgment against a Canadian company, this time for costs incurred
in removing hazardous substances from a copper processing site in
Milford, Utah, in which Shield had previously held title. 149 After the de-
fendants failed to appear in U.S. district court, the Ontario Superior
Court granted summary judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs.15 0 Shield
alleged that two U.S. corporations who held title in the site at one time or
another were actually responsible for the hazardous waste. 151 Shield
raised two of the defenses mentioned in United States v. Ivey, first arguing
that the steps taken by the U.S. government were a breach of natural
justice due to lack of proper service and then arguing that the United
States violated public policy by pursuing a Canadian corporation for resti-
tution under CERCLA while at the same time failing to pursue the two
American corporations that were responsible for the contamination. 52
143. Id. at 550.
144. Id. at 552.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 553.
147. Id. at 553.
148. United States v. Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R. (3d) 370 (O.C.A.).
149. United States v. Shield, [2004] 74 O.R. (3d) 583 (O.S.C.J.).
150. Id. at 594-595.
151. Id. at 592-93.
152. Id. at 585.
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Like the Ivey court before it, the court here found that there was a real
and substantial connection between the jurisdiction of the foreign court
and the action on which the judgment was based, though Shield did not
dispute this particular issue.153 The court also stated that the United
States had not committed a breach of natural justice, nor was enforce-
ment by Canada of a judgment obtained under CERCLA a violation of
public policy.154 Thus, there are two similar court decisions rendered by
Canadian courts, one before Pakootas and one after Pakootas, that have
recognized CERCLA does not violate Canadian public policy and, in the
Ivey case, noting the substantial similarities between CERCLA and
OEPA. But just because a CERCLA judgment may be enforceable in
Canada, the discussion does not end there. One must also consider the
current and potential effects on comity principles.
B. COMITY
1. Edwards v. D.T.E. Energy Co.
A Canadian citizen is currently suing Michigan-based D.T.E. Energy
Co. in a Canadian court under the Canadian Fisheries Act for its alleged
role in contaminating the St. Clair River. 155 The river is bordered by the
state of Michigan to the West, and the province of Ontario to the East. 1
56
The D.T.E. Energy facility releases approximately 2,000 pounds of mer-
cury each year with over half of the emissions ending up in Canada.' 57
Currently, the entire St. Clair River is considered an "area of concern"
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).158 The
GLWQA is itself the result of a report issued by the IJC at the behest of
the United States and Canada, which called for new water quality control
programs. 159 Signed by President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau in 1972, the agreement sets forth general and specific
water quality objectives and defines the role of the IJC.160 Like other
similar agreements before it, such as those mentioned in Part II, the
agreement has been regarded as a failure due in large part to its lack of
enforcement mechanisms. 161 Rather than relying solely on an interna-
tional mechanism, it appears Edwards, much like Pakootas, chose instead
to turn to a private cause of action conferred by a federal statute, against
153. Id. at 586.
154. Id. at 592, 594.
155. Edwards v. D.T.E. Energy Co., 2008 On. C. LEXIS 4428 (O.S.C.J. 2008); Lake
Ontario Waterkeeper, Edwards v. D.T.E. Engery: Backgrounder, July 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.waterkeeper.ca/documents/DTE.Backgrounder%20(updated%
20July%202008).pdf.
156. Edwards v. D.T.E. Engery: Backgrounder, supra note 153.
157. Waterkeeper Alliance, DTE Energy Company accused of environmental offences
in Canada, (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.waterkeeper.org/mainarticledetails.aspx?ar-
ticleid=285.
158. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, St. Clair River Area of Concern, May 28,
2008, available at http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/aoc/st-clair.html.
159. Hall, supra note 2, at 711.
160. Id.
161. Hall, supra note 2, at 712.
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a foreign corporation, in what is essentially a reversal of the nationalities
involved in Pakootas.
The attorney appearing on behalf of Edwards in the Ontario Superior
Court argued that the lower court judge erred in stating that he was
bound to dismiss the cause of action based on international comity for
several reasons.162 First, he began by noting that the 1909 Water Treaty
does not actually confer exclusive jurisdiction to the IJC, but rather that
the dispute may be resolved by the IJC if both governments agree to it.163
He further argued that because the United States is allowing such prose-
cution under their domestic statute, even with the existence of the 1909
Water Treaty, it would not violate principles of comity if a Canadian citi-
zen were permitted to do the same.164 The court then granted the appli-
cation for mandamus 165 and the case was set to begin for trial on
February 2, 2009.166 As of the date of submission, the case is still pend-
ing. The resolution of this case, assuming no settlement is reached, may
in fact be a harbinger for the direction international environmental law
takes, at least as it concerns Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
2. Arc Ecology v. United States Dep't of the Air Force
Another case that is worth brief discussion is Arc Ecology v. United
States Dep't of the Air Force.167 In this case, the question before the
Ninth Circuit was whether CERCLA is applicable to claims brought by a
citizen of a foreign country against the United States in order to compel
the United States to assess the alleged pollution caused by a former U.S.
military base located in a foreign country. 168 The court concluded that
nothing in the language of CERCLA permitted an extraterritorial appli-
cation of the statute. 169 The reason for the differing results in Arc Ecol-
ogy and Pakootas is clear upon examination of the facts of each case. In
Arc Ecology, the court began by operating under the assumption that
allowing a claim under CERCLA in this case would be an extraterritorial
application. The court then concluded that the presumption could not be
overcome with regards to CERCLA.170 In Pakootas, the court worked
from the presumption that the application of CERCLA to the facts of the
case would not raise the issue of extraterritorial application because all of
the acts necessary to allow a cause of action took place within the physi-
cal boundaries of the United States.17 1




166. Edwards v. D.T.E. Engery: Backgrounder, supra note 153.
167. Arc Ecology v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 411 F.3d. 1092 (9th Cir.
2003).
168. Id. at 1094.
169. Id. at 1097-98.
170. Id. at 1098.
171. Pakootas,452 F.3d 1068-69.
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These two cases, when taken together, appear to stand for the proposi-
tion that the question of extraterritorial application of CERCLA will
only be considered if any of the required acts have taken place outside
the physical jurisdiction of the United States.172 In all other instances, it
may be a domestic application of CERCLA and the court need not con-
sider whether the corporation and the initial act are both located in a
foreign nation, but only whether the effects are felt in the United States,
as the definition of "facility" and "release," as discussed previously, has
been given a more liberal reading. 173 This proposition also raises the
question of whether the application of Fisheries Act in Edwards would
even be an extraterritorial application of Canada's own environmental
statute, given the recent approach taken by the 9th Circuit in Pakootas
and Arc Ecology.
3. Canada's Federal Environmental Protection Laws
Canada, like the United States, has several national statutes designed
to curtail destructive environmental impacts within its borders, the two
most powerful being the Fisheries Act174 and the Canadian Environmen-
tal Protection Act (CEPA).175 Passed in 1999, the CEPA consolidated
several federal environmental statutes and charged the federal govern-
ment with the regulation of toxic substances, a responsibility that had
been traditionally controlled by the provinces. 176 Like CERCLA, CEPA
recognizes and applies the "polluter pays" principle, 177 which requires
that the party or parties responsible for the contamination of the site be
responsible for cleanup costs. Moreover, when one compares another
Canadian statute, British Columbia's Environmental Management Act
(EMA), with CERCLA, it is apparent that both statutes are remedial in
nature in the sense that they both apply this principle as well. 178 Accord-
ing to Professor Robinson-Dorn, this is no coincidence, as the drafters of
the EMA modeled their statute after CERCLA,179 suggesting that, as the
Ontario court stated in Ivey when speaking of the OEPA, the similarities
of the two countries' environmental statutes are more striking than their
differences.
Furthermore, CEPA itself specifically provides for citizen-suits. 180
And, as mentioned earlier, a case is now currently pending that might
allow a citizen-suit against a U.S. corporation under section 40(1) and
40(2) of the Fisheries Act. 181 Even if the court rejects Edwards' claim, it
172. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10.
173. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 473.
174. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. C. F-14 (1985) amended by ch. 14, 1994 S.C. 1 (Can.).
175. Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), R.S.C., ch. 33 (1999) (Can.).
176. William R. Mackay, Canadian Federalism and the Environment: The Literature, 17
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 32 (2004).
177. CEPA, R.S.C., preamble (1999) (Can.).
178. Hall, supra note 2, at 735-36.
179. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 10, at 310.
180. CEPA, R.S.C., §§ 17(1), 22(1)(a)-(b).
181. Edwards,2008 On. C. LEXIS 4428.
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seems as though Canada is moving closer towards the position that the
United States has recently taken regarding the issue of transnational pol-
lution. But if Canada does allow the claim, it would not be the first time
in which Canada liberally construed the Fisheries Act. In 1995, a Cana-
dian warship fired upon a Spanish ship approximately two hundred miles
off of Canada's coast in international waters. 182 Canada was concerned
that turbot fishing off of its coast had exceeded quotas set by the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), of which Canada was a
member, and called for a moratorium on turbot fishing to sort the issue
out.1 83 The Spanish vessel did not heed Canada's request and was
boarded shortly after being fired upon. 184 Pursuant to section seven of
the Fisheries Act, a Canadian protection officer is permitted to board and
inspect any ship in NAFO waters to ensure compliance with regula-
tions.185 The protection officer, then, was no doubt acting in accordance
with Canadian law, but the question remained whether the actions taken
by the protection officer violated international law.1 86
After the incident, Spain filed an application to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and instituted proceedings against Canada.t 87 In that
case, the court was asked to determine whether Canada's claim of juris-
diction over a foreign ship was opposable and whether the boarding of
the Spanish ship violated the freedoms of navigation and fishing on the
high seas.' 88 Unfortunately, the court dismissed the proceeding for want
of jurisdiction and did not have the opportunity to answer these ques-
tions.' 89 The court went on to state that the decision turned not on the
legality of Canada's actions, but whether its reservation to the ICJ was
sufficient to provide the ICJ with the right to exercise jurisdiction. 190
More importantly, the incident illustrates that the Fisheries Act can and
has been applied to a foreign individual whose actions were having a det-
rimental effect on the Canadian environment, even though that individ-
ual's actions were arguably not within the physical jurisdiction of Canada.
C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Though much ink has been spilled over the issue of the extraterritorial
application of CERCLA, even if one concludes that CERCLA was ap-
plied extraterritorially, the result may still be justified under the Restate-
182. John DeMont et al., Gunboat Diplomacy, MACLEAN'S (Can.), Mar. 20, 1995, at 11.
183. Patrick Shavloske, The Canadian-Spanish Fishing Dispute: A Template for Assess-
ing the Inadequacies of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and a
Clarion Call for Ratification of the New Fish Stock Treaty, 7 IND. INT'L & CoMp. L.
REV. 223, 231 (1996).
184. Id. at 231-32.
185. Id. at 232.
186. Id. at 233.
187. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.J.C. 432 (Dec. 4).
188. Id. at 437.
189. Id. at 458.
190. Id. at 452.
2009]
884 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations. 191 In fact, according to this
restatement, one sovereign may exercise jurisdiction over another sover-
eign if any one of five circumstances is present.192 Extraterritorial appli-
cation is appropriate with respect to: (1) conduct that takes place within
the territory of the sovereign affected; (2) conduct that affects the status
of persons, or interests of things within the territory; (3) conduct outside
its territory has, or is intended to have substantial effect within its terri-
tory; (4) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside
as well as inside its territory; and (5) certain conduct outside its territory
by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the
state or against a limited class of other state interest. 193
At least three of these circumstances are arguably present in Pakootas.
The strongest case may be made for the third situation, as there is little
doubt that the actions of Teck Cominco's smelter have had a substantial
effect within the territory of the United States.194 A strong case may also
be made for the first situation if one considers the release of pollutants
from, to borrow the language of Pakootas, a "facility" within the United
States to be "conduct" that takes place within its territories. 195 A
stronger case may be made, however, under the second circumstance be-
cause, even if one were to conclude that the conduct took place outside
the territory of the United States, so long as it affects the status of person
or interests of things, the claim is a colorable one. 196 Neither would it be
unusual for the United States to pursue a claim based on the circum-
stances described above. In fact, the United States has extraterritorially
applied federal statutes in regards to antitrust activities, trademark in-
fringement, and drug smuggling.1 97 The legal justification may be pre-
sent, but even if the United States and perhaps, by extension, Canada and
Mexico, can pursue causes of actions against other sovereign states, the
issue that must then be addressed is whether or not they should.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF A MORE EXPANSIVE REGIME TO
ADDRESS TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION
A. THE STOCKHOLM PRINCIPLES AND THE HELSINKI RULES
Seeing as both Canada and the United States consider the Stockholm
Principles a consolidation of international environmental law, it is helpful
to use this agreement, and specifically Principle 21, as a starting point.
Although it might be possible to square the Pakootas decision with a
loose interpretation of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Principles, it might
not be necessary. A plain reading of the Principles indicates that a State
191. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (1987).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 469.
195. Id.
196. See Restatement (Third), § 402(1)(b).
197. Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid the Current Wave
of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543, 548 (1991).
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has a responsibility not to cause harm to another State's environment. 198
Unless one disagrees with the factual findings of the EPA, 199 it is hard to
reach the conclusion that the Canadian smelter did not cause precisely
such injury. Moreover, the reason the Pakootas decision does not run
afoul of the Stockholm Principles is because those principles speak to
conduct, but do not prescribe what actions may be taken once one of the
principles is violated.200 The court echoed this stance court in Amlon
Metals.20 Therefore, it is left up to the parties themselves to decide what
corrective action to take, whether it be deference to the polluter in the
name of international cooperation or an application of a federal domestic
statute to a foreign corporation.
Applying the theory of limited territorial sovereignty as enunciated in
the Helsinki Rules,20 2 Canada's use of the Columbia River would not be
acceptable because it interfered with the reasonable use of water on the
other side of the border and, in fact, has done so for decades. But where
the Stockholm Principles state that Canada must not interfere with the
United States' reasonable use of water, the Helsinki Rules instruct that
Canada's preexisting water use must be reasonable,20 3 a subtle but impor-
tant distinction. Furthermore, the eleven factors that are to be taken into
consideration have, for the most part, created a convoluted framework by
which to judge the equitable use of water.2 0 4 If Canada's use of the water
is deemed reasonable, in spite of its harmful effect on the United States,
then according to the prior appropriation doctrine, which gives prefer-
ence to existing reasonable uses over other uses,2 0 5 under the Helsinki
Rules, Canada's water use would be acceptable. It is hard to explain the
different potential outcomes under the two respective agreements with-
out resorting to what may amount to a truism that Canada's reasonable
use is one that does not unreasonably affect the United States.
B. UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS
Once the 9th Circuit rendered its decision in Pakootas, concerns were
raised immediately about the potential growth of litigation between sov-
ereign states in domestic court as well as the possibility of a contentious
diplomatic relationship between the United States and Canada. 20 6 One
practitioner has stated that the case may have "enormous ramifications
for international diplomacy and treaty-making, and lead to much cross-
border litigation" and that the decision threatens to disrupt United
198. Stockholm Principles, Principle 21.
199. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 469.
200. See generally Stockholm Principles.
201. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
202. Schwabach, supra note 32, at 327.
203. Helsinki Rules, supra note 91, art 7.
204. Ian J. Silverbrand, Comment, Israel-Palestinian Water Literature's Misplaced De-
pendence on International Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 603, 613 (2007).
205. Id. at 613-14.
206. Clearing the Air, supra note 7.
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States' ties with Canada. 20 7 It is for this reason that the Edwards case
may have a significant impact on the NAFTA countries. If, on the one
hand, the court decides to apply reasoning similar to Pakootas, we may
see a growth in cross-border litigation. If the court resolves the issue this
way, however, then it could also be argued that comity between the two
countries would not be offended, but strengthened since they would both
permit suits against a foreign corporation if that corporation has caused
direct harm to the sovereign through transnational pollution. On the
other hand, if the court does not recognize a principle similar to the one
enunciated in Pakootas, the fears that comity may be disrupted would
increase as the United States would now allow its citizens to sue a foreign
corporation for transnational pollution, while the citizen in Canada would
not be permitted to do the same.
The concern over potential liability of a corporation in a foreign juris-
diction has sounded alarms not only for legal practitioners, but also for
those who may be potentially involved in such litigation. 20 8 The National
Mining Association, for example, sent letters to Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and EPA administrator Michael
Leavitt, imploring the administration to try and resolve the issue through
diplomatic means, as a resort to litigation could be "devastating" if U.S.
corporations were forced to defend suit in either Canada or Mexico. 20 9
The Edison Electric Institute, an association of shareholder-owned elec-
tric companies, sent a letter on behalf of the nation's private utilities com-
panies, and Thomas Kuhn, speaking for the Edison Electric Institute,
stated "unilateral EPA action raises the possibility of Canadian retalia-
tion against our member countries" and that such enforcement "should
be one of last resort, not first resort. '210
Even if CERCLA is used to pursue foreign corporations that pollute
within the United States, its application is likely to be limited to certain,
specific circumstances in accordance with section 9611(1) of the stat-
ute.2 11 That is not to say that the application of statutes such as CER-
CLA could not be a useful means to reduce transnational pollution.
Currently, there are several ongoing conflicts between the United States
and Canada regarding this issue. 212 These disputes are affecting Mon-
tana, Alaska, British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba, just to name a
few.213 As stated by Illinois' Assistant Attorney General for Environ-
mental Enforcement Katherine Hausruth, U.S. companies should not be
able to use CERCLA as a shield to prevent remediation and liability
207. Id.
208. Karen Dorn Steele, Plans Differ for Fixing Pollution from Canada; Industry
Groups Fear Retaliatory Pollution Accusations, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW,
June 20, 2004, at A8.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Hausrath, supra note 105, at 23.
212. Parrish, supra note 5, at 380-81.
213. Id. at 380-81.
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under CERCLA. 214
C. UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS
Although the litigation in Pakootas involved Canada and the United
States, Mexico would likely not be shielded if there is a shift for nations
to be more open regarding the potential efficacy of domestic litigation to
resolve transnational disputes. Specifically, Mexico's maquiladora indus-
try may be severely affected. A maquiladora is a foreign-owned plant
located in Mexico that receives shipments of raw materials and compo-
nents and then turns those materials into goods that are then sent to the
United States, as well as other countries. 2 15 One source estimates that
26,000 U.S.-based companies supply maquiladoras with raw goods and
components. 2 16 In 1965, Mexico created the Border Industrialization
Program, a program designed to facilitate financial incentives for foreign
investment in the maquiladora system.217 Due to favorable U.S. Cus-
toms regulations, an importer of these goods only has to pay duty on the
value added by the assembly.218 The goal was to capitalize on U.S. tech-
nology and cheap, available labor in Mexico. 219 Along with the passage
of NAFTA, the industry saw astronomical growth.220 This growth, how-
ever, has also led to large amounts of pollution.22 1 But even before the
NAFrA growth, Mexico's Secretary of Urban Development and Ecology
estimated that over 1000 maquiladoras generated hazardous waste mater-
ials.222 Due to lax regulation, illegal waste materials, including raw sew-
age and toxic metals, began filling the Borderlands. 223 Officials of U.S.
companies also admit that toxic waste disposal in Mexico is a serious
problem.224
There are several current causes of concern between Mexico and the
United States. For example, sewage from Tijuana is alleged to have pol-
luted the San Diego beaches, Mexicans are worried about a proposed
waste disposal facility in South Texas, and Texans are complaining that
Coahuila power plants are causing pollution over the skies of Big Bend
National Park. 225 More recently, however, the United States has taken
214. Hausrath, supra note 105, at 27.
215. Maria Dickerson, Border Factories Up and Humming: Jobs and Shipments are Ris-
ing, but Mexico's Stalled Reforms Could Slow the Maquiladoras' Economic Re-
gime, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at C1.
216. Id.
217. Edward J. Williams, The Maquiladora Industry and Environmental Degradation in
the United States-Mexico Borderlands, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 772-73 (1996).
218. Elizabeth C. Rose, Comment, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAW 223 (1989).
219. Williams, supra note 215, at 772-73.
220. Between Here and There, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, available at http://
www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?storyid=682889.
221. Williams supra note 215, at 774.
222. Id. at 780.
223. Id. at 775.
224. Rose, supra note 216, at 225.
225. Parrish, supra note 5, at n. 96.
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steps to reduce the amount of pollution migrating from Mexico into the
United States. For example, the ambitious Bajagua project mentioned in
section II is expected, upon completion, to greatly reduce the amount of
wastewater treatment, treating up to 59 million gallons of wastewater per
day.226 But doubts have surfaced about this project in light of the $66
million federal funding package to upgrade sewage treatment along the
San Diego-Tijuana border, none of which will go to the Bajagua Pro-
ject. 227 San Diego Congressman Bob Filner, for example, stated that the
Bajagua Project "will never see the light of day. . .-1228 With the current
concern regarding pollution along the U.S.-Mexico border and the floun-
dering of projects such as Bajagua, it might not be surprising if a U.S.
citizen or environmental group turns to CERCLA to enforce pollution
cleanup against businesses like maquiladoras in light of the recent
Pakootas decision.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Neither would it be surprising if the majority of these types of claims
are brought by social action groups, 229 as opposed to individual citizens.
Since a court cannot award punitive damages under CERCLA, the ex-
pectation was that the suits that would be brought would likely be merito-
rious,2 30 and, in the case of CERCLA, it would only force the polluter to
clean up the site or reimburse the government for doing so. 231 Fears have
already emerged that, instead of promoting democracy at the individual
level, these types of suits may consolidate power in the hands of a few
special interest groups, contributing less to environmental improvement,
and more towards a greater proliferation of these groups' private agen-
das. 232 The reason is that, although a citizen may be allowed to pursue a
transnational pollution claim individually, that citizen will not have the
time or resources of an environmental group. For example, under the
U.S. Clean Water Act of 1972, which allows for citizen suits, of the 806
notices of intent to sue filed between May 1984 and September 1988, 532
came from either national or regional environmental groups. 233 In fact,
over half of all notices of intent to sue were filed by just five such envi-
ronmental groups during that time period. 234
The large number of notices of intent to sue may in fact be targeted not
226. Wilkie, supra note 49.
227. Mike Lee, Bush Budget Keeps Out of Sewage Controversy; No Money Specifically
Set for Bajagua Project, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 6, 2007, at B1.
228. Wilkie, supra note 49.
229. See Williams, supra note 215, at 801-02.
230. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 356-57 (1990).
231. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 117.
232. Sylvia LeRoy, The Environmental Right to Sue: Should Canada Follow America's
Litigious Lead?, FRASER FORUM, April 2002, at 5, available at http://www.fraser-
america.org/Commerce.Web/product files/EnvironmentalRighttoSue.pdf.
233. Greve, supra note 229, at 353-54.
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at environmental improvement, but attorneys' fees.2 35 Oftentimes, an en-
vironmental group will file the initial paperwork necessary to investigate
the corporation and use that as leverage to force a settlement as the cor-
poration will likely find it cheaper to settle early rather than risk the large
amounts of fines and an EPA investigation under the Clean Water Act.236
There is no reason to think that an extraterritorial application of CER-
CLA would be immune from this kind of action, especially given the po-
tential magnitude of disputes over transnational pollution. On the other
hand, that does not mean that a Pakootas-style means of enforcement is
not worth the risk. One of the primary reasons for the citizen suit is the
legitimate expectation that a statute will be enforced and when a govern-
ment fails to do so, a promise has been broken and it is incumbent upon
the citizen to assist where the government fails.237 This theory can and
should be applied to transnational pollution on an international scale.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States, under Pakootas and perhaps Canada in the forth-
coming Edwards decision, may now permit suit against a corporation in
the victim state, as opposed to suing the responsible party in the forum of
the polluting state itself, which is currently the standard practice. 238 It is
this "harmonizing function," as Professor Noah D. Hall has called it, that
allows the weakness of resolution through international means, primarily
due to lack of enforcement powers, to be offset by permitting citizen-suits
in situations such as Pakootas.239 These types of suits may eventually im-
pact industries like maquiladoras, regardless of U.S.-based ownership.
Although the potential for upsetting diplomatic relations would still be
present, allowing these suits to go forward would permit greater citizen
involvement in the process and may provide for more efficient resolu-
tions. Additionally, a watchful eye must also be kept on environmental
groups as a whole so as not to encourage frivolous lawsuits in order to
force settlement for attorneys' fees, so that these citizen suits will not
result in what one industry representative said amounts to a form of
extortion.240
But this concern alone should not prevent the continual exploration of
greater citizen enforcement, as the status quo has its obvious drawbacks.
For instance, the Trail Smelter Arbitration took over a decade before the
Convention was established, and then another seven years for the IJC to
issue its ruling.2 4 1 Moreover, if the court in Edwards permits suit against
235. LeRoy, supra note 231, at 5.
236. Greve, supra note 229, at 358.
237. Marcia Valiante, "Welcomed Participants" or" Environmental Vigilantes?" The
CEPA Environmental Protection Action and the Role of Citizen Suits in Federal
Environmental Law, 25 DALHOUSIE L.J. 81, 93 (2002).
238. Hall, supra note 2, at 736.
239. Id. at 736-37.
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a U.S. corporation, it may signal a larger shift in the realm of interna-
tional environmental law away from reliance solely on means of resolu-
tions such as international treaties and arbitration and more towards a
system in which the individual citizen is given greater influence on the
environment surrounding him, even if the source of harm is located
outside the physical jurisdiction of his State.
